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Abstract
To address the rising concern that algorithmic decision-making may reinforce dis-
criminatory biases, researchers have proposed many notions of fairness and corre-
sponding mathematical formalizations. Each of these notions is often presented as 
a one-size-fits-all, absolute condition; however, in reality, the practical and ethical 
trade-offs are unavoidable and more complex. We introduce a new approach that 
considers fairness—not as a binary, absolute mathematical condition—but rather, 
as a relational notion in comparison to alternative decisionmaking processes. Using 
US mortgage lending as an example use case, we discuss the ethical foundations of 
each definition of fairness and demonstrate that our proposed methodology more 
closely captures the ethical trade-offs of the decision-maker, as well as forcing a 
more explicit representation of which values and objectives are prioritised.
Keywords Algorithmic fairness · Mortgage discrimination · Fairness trade-offs · 
Machine learning · Technology ethics
1 Introduction
Algorithms are increasingly being used to make important decisions to improve effi-
ciency, reduce costs, and enhance personalisation of products and services. Despite 
these opportunities, the hesitation around implementing algorithms can be attributed 
to the risk that the algorithms may systematically reinforce past discriminatory prac-
tices, favouring some groups over others on the basis of race and gender and thereby 
exacerbating societal inequalities. While human decision-making and rules-based 
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processes are prone to their own unfair biases and inaccurate predictions, algorithms 
have been subject to higher scrutiny due to their limited transparency and their scal-
ability. A decision based on an algorithm is less transparent or explainable than a 
rules-based process (e.g. if X, then Y). Whereas a human decision-maker with the 
same cognitive biases may vary his or her decisions, an algorithmic decision based 
on a bias is capable of perpetuating discrimination at-scale.
Credit risk evaluation is a highly regulated domain area in the United States and 
has not yet widely adopted algorithmic decision-making. New financial technology 
companies have started to push the boundaries by using non-traditional data such 
as location, payment, and social media to predict credit risk (Koren 2016). Even 
in mortgage lending, scholars have begun to consider whether machine learning 
(ML) algorithms can lead to more accurate predictions of default and whether there 
is an increase in financial inclusion of those who would not have received a loan 
under a simpler decision-making process (Fuster et al. 2017). There has been a body 
of established literature on how access to credit is crucial to promoting economic 
growth, and exclusion from this financial access can trap individuals in poverty 
without the possibility of upward mobility (King and Levine 1993). Unequal access 
to credit based on race and gender cripples the previously disadvantaged groups and 
widens the gap in welfare.
To ensure that algorithmic predictions are “fair,” scholars have introduced numer-
ous definitions to formalise fairness as a mathematical condition, such as equal 
odds, positive predictive parity, and counterfactual fairness (Hardt et  al. 2016; 
Chouldechova 2017; Kusner et al. 2017). This has led to attempts at differentiating 
between them, such as the tutorial on “21 Definitions of Fairness and their Poli-
tics” (Narayanan 2018) and the article “Fairness Definitions Explained” (Verma and 
Rubin 2018). Others have launched technical implementations of the definitions to 
produce reports on whether an algorithm passes or fails each test, such as the Aequi-
tas tool by UChicago (Saleiro et  al. 2018). The abundance of fairness definitions 
has obfuscated which definition is most suitable for each use case. It is difficult to 
interpret the outcomes of the various fairness tests, given that many of them are 
mathematically incompatible (Kleinberg et al. 2018). This is especially true in mort-
gage lending, where there has been a documented history of discrimination against 
black borrowers. Moreover, the drivers of default on a mortgage are not well under-
stood because various borrower and macroeconomic features, many of which are 
not measured, can contribute to this outcome. These factors preclude the ability to 
mathematically disentangle the proxies of default risk from proxies of race to equal-
ise the algorithms’ predictions for black and white borrowers.
We use the complex sources of discrimination shown in mortgage lending lit-
erature as an indicative example to discuss the limitations of existing approaches 
to fairness at measuring racial discrimination. The US mortgage data are used to 
demonstrate a new methodology that views fairness as a trade-off of objectives—not 
as an absolute mathematical condition—but in relation to an alternative decision-
making process.
This article is organised into four sections. Section  1 discusses the complex 
sources of discrimination in mortgage lending, and Sect.  2 introduces the data 
and algorithms used in this article. Section 3 demonstrates some of the contextual 
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limitations of existing definitions of fairness. Section 4 proposes a new methodology 
of trade-offs between objectives.
Overall, we to show that existing approaches to fairness do not sufficiently cap-
ture the challenge of racial discrimination in mortgage lending and propose a new 
methodology that focuses on relational trade-offs rather than absolute mathemati-
cal conditions. The US mortgage lending data are used as an example case study 
to bring to life some of the contextual complexities. It is important to note that it is 
not the purpose of this article to attempt to draw any empirical conclusions about 
the presence of discrimination in mortgage lending decisions. This is not possible 
with the limitations of the public data set, and past studies reviewed in Chapter 1 
have already addressed this research question. The main contribution of this article 
is to build on the past literature on fairness as an absolute notion to propose a new 
conversation on fairness as trade-offs specific to each context. The current prolif-
eration of fairness definitions is confounding the debate by presenting fairness as a 
generalised, one-size-fits-all, and absolute goal. Without appropriate translation of 
the prediction disparity into tangible outcomes, the pass/fail fairness tests do not 
provide sufficient clarity on which algorithm is the best suited for a decision. This 
article fills this gap by introducing a methodology that views fairness as a relative 
notion and quantifies the contextual trade-offs, such that it provides the decision-
maker with clear, concrete ways in which each algorithm meets his or her objectives.
2  Discrimination in Mortgage Lending
2.1  Legal Framework for Discrimination
To contextualise the analysis of US mortgage lending data, we will focus our dis-
cussion on the US legal framework. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
requires collection and disclosure of individual-level data for lenders, including race 
and gender, which allows for greater transparency, accountability, and academic 
scrutiny in a domain with a history of contentious discriminatory practices. Econo-
mists have consistently shown the presence of racial discrimination in various US 
mortgage markets (Munnell et al. 1996), with the exception of a few who argue that 
any inequality in outcome is driven by differences in default risk (Ladd 1998).
The controversy around what constitutes unfair lending arises in part because 
some economists’ definitions are narrower than the legal definition of discrimina-
tion (Ladd 1998). There are two concepts in legal literature: disparate treatment and 
disparate impact. Recently, there has been a shift in focus from disparate treatment 
to disparate impact in legal decisions. According to the US Supreme Court decision 
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. the Inclusive Communities 
Project, disparate impact is illegal under the Fair Housing Act regardless of intent 
(Scalia et al. 2015).
Disparate treatment can be sub-divided into taste-based discrimination and statis-
tical discrimination. The former is the exercise of prejudicial tastes, sometimes for-
feiting profit. The latter derives from using the applicant’s group (e.g. race) to esti-
mate the credit-worthiness, given the expected difference in statistical distribution of 
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credit-worthiness between groups. Disparate impact goes beyond the intent to dis-
criminate and focuses on the outcome: any policy or practice that puts one protected 
group at a disproportionate disadvantage is discriminatory.
In anti-discrimination philosophy, Cass Sunstein writes, “without good reason, 
social and legal structures should not turn differences that are both highly visible 
and irrelevant from the moral point of view into systematic social disadvantages” 
[emphasis added] (Sunstein 1994). He leaves room for reasonable justification for 
outcome disparity, which is reflected in the US legal precedent: the “business neces-
sity clause” in the US that provides an exception when the process is “an appropriate 
means of ensuring that disparate-impact liability is properly limited” (Scalia et al. 
2015).
In reality, however, it is challenging to establish that the outcome is driven by 
“legitimate” features and not by protected characteristics. Proxies of risk are often 
intertwined with proxies of protected features. A paired audit study found that 
minority borrowers were more often encouraged to consider FHA loans, which are 
considered to be substantially more expensive to finance (Ross et al. 2008). In this 
case, FHA loan type can be considered both a proxy for race and a proxy for default 
risk. This challenge is exacerbated by the increase in use of non-traditional prox-
ies of risk, e.g. social media and location data. Algorithms can discover patterns 
in data that predict the desired outcome “that are really just preexisting patterns of 
exclusion and inequality,” which cannot be resolved computationally (Barocas and 
Selbst 2016). Finally, often “fairness” presumes that there is a ground truth in each 
person’s risk. However, existing data often represent imperfect information on each 
individual’s risk.
2.2  Sources of Discriminatory Bias
Lenders experience information asymmetry and are limited by the data collected in 
estimating default risk of mortgage applicants. This section will show the complex 
ways in which this risk may be over-estimated or underestimated, demonstrating the 
need for an approach that is more conscious of the contextual sources of unfair bias.
2.2.1  Over‑Estimation of Minority Risk
There are three sources of bias that can over-estimate minority default risk: selection 
bias, disparate treatment, and self-perpetuation of the selection bias. First, there is 
documented discrimination preceding any data record: in the selection of the insti-
tution’s service area, in their advertising and marketing strategy (Ladd 1998). The 
limited outreach in high-minority neighbourhoods reduces the likelihood of their 
application, resulting in selection bias, in which borrowers with certain character-
istics are over-represented in the data. The second source of bias is active dispa-
rate treatment, which includes both taste-based discrimination—exercise of preju-
dicial tastes, sometimes forfeiting profit—and statistical discrimination—the use of 
the applicant’s group (e.g. race) to estimate credit-worthiness. Disparate treatment 
against black borrowers has been demonstrated in a number of paired audit studies, 
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in which individuals with comparable profiles but different racial backgrounds 
inquire about a mortgage and record the advised loan amount, terms, and likelihood 
of approval. A study in Chicago found that black applicants on average were quoted 
lower loan amounts and receive less information and assistance in applying for a 
mortgage (Ross et al. 2008). Finally, the problem of selection bias is exacerbated by 
the self-perpetuation of the discrimination in the subsequent application stages. As 
loans by black applicants are denied at a higher rate, the counterfactual of whether 
or not they would have defaulted had their application been approved is not meas-
ured and thus unknown.
Given the resulting limitation on the data set’s external validity, lenders relying 
on the data set as the ground truth risk over-estimating the risk of black borrowers 
and lending only to applications similar to past successes (i.e. fully repaid loans). It 
is in the lender’s financial interest to expand the volume of credit-worthy borrowers. 
Building the algorithm on the flawed data set necessarily would produce both dis-
criminatory and sub-optimal result.
2.2.2  Under‑Estimation of Minority Risk
Disparate impact goes beyond the intent to discriminate and focuses on the outcome: 
any policy or practice that puts one protected group at a disproportionate disadvan-
tage is discriminatory unless it is “consistent with business necessity” (Scalia et al. 
2015). While this is open to interpretation, several regression studies demonstrated 
that black borrowers have lower approval rates for mortgage than white Americans, 
which cannot be explained by other legitimate loan or borrower characteristics. 
Even after controlling for a comprehensive list of all default risk, default cost, and 
loan characteristics, a prominent study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston found 
that black and Hispanic borrowers are 8% more likely to be denied a loan than non-
Hispanic white borrowers (Munnell et al. 1996). Given this disparity cannot be oth-
erwise attributed to a business reason, it would be considered illegal.
Some scholars have argued that higher denial rates may simply be reflecting the 
higher risk: because black borrowers’ default rates are higher on average than those 
of white borrowers with similar features, the lenders are not discriminating based on 
taste (Berkovec et al. 1996). However, this is narrower than the legal definition, as 
disparate impact is illegal regardless of the motivation. These studies have also been 
widely critiqued, as it is difficult to control for all possible drivers of default, and 
the difference in means does not indicate an inherent difference in credit-worthiness 
attributable to race (Ladd 1998).
Could the default risk be higher for black borrowers? Some have attempted to 
attribute the difference to the risk derived from financial behaviour and racial dif-
ferences in wealth and asset preferences. This has been refuted, as when controlling 
for income and education level, the racial disparities in saving behaviour disappears 
between white and black Americans (Mariela 2018). However, it is possible to imag-
ine there could be a difference in risk due to social and historical prejudice in related 
markets, which may impact credit-worthiness in an unmeasurable and unpredictable 
manner. For example, if discrimination in the job market makes minority incomes 
more unstable (e.g. more likely to be laid off in a restructuring), race could be the 
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only possible proxy to measure this risk, which would be higher for black borrowers. 
While selection bias and disparate treatment may lead a lender to overestimate the 
risk of minority borrowers, market inequalities may underestimate the risk.
This structural and systematic discrimination is likely to manifest itself in the 
seemingly “legitimate” features that are used to measure the borrower’s likelihood 
of repayment. It would be myopic to view the potentially higher black default risk in 
isolation from the intersectional discrimination faced by those already marginalised 
in society (Crenshaw 1989) and the interconnectivity of gender and racial discrimi-
nation (Collins 2002). Indeed, mortgage discrimination based on gender and famil-
ial status may vary by the applicant’s race (Robinson 2002).
If lenders believe that the true risk is, in fact, lower for black borrowers than 
can be predicted by the data set, they should actively market to and lend to more 
black borrowers, expanding its customer base to minorities that are credit-worthy 
but under-represented in the data set. This may reduce the reported precision of the 
algorithm in the short-term, but with more information collected on these loans, the 
data would move to more closely reflect their true risk. As for the risk underesti-
mation, better proxies should be measured to estimate the unknowns, e.g. income 
volatility, which may be correlated to race on aggregate but may vary within racial 
groups. This points to two incentives for the lender: (1) increase in market share and 
(2) more precise prediction of default risk.
2.3  Impact of Algorithms
While racial discrimination in lending has been studied for at least the past century, 
there has been a more recent increase in implementation of machine learning algo-
rithms to predict credit risk and a corresponding increase in scrutiny on whether or 
not the predictions are fair. For the purpose of this article, algorithms are defined as 
a process or procedures that extracts patterns from data. Algorithms discussed in 
this article for mortgage lending are supervised machine learning models that use 
past examples to predict an outcome. This excludes rules-based processes, such as 
a scorecard, which follow a set of explicit rules pre-set by a human decision-maker 
(e.g. if income > X and if loan amount < y, then approve). Algorithms can be both 
fairer and more accurate than humans or rules-based processes (Kleinberg et  al. 
2018); however, the widespread discomfort with the use of algorithms to make deci-
sions derives from the tension between the opportunity to more accurately predict 
default and the risk of systematically reinforcing existing biases in the data, wors-
ening inequalities at an unprecedented scale. In particular, machine learning algo-
rithms may, without explicitly knowing an applicant’s race, be capable of triangu-
lating racial information from a combination of the applicant and loan’s features. 
Algorithms can discover patterns in data that predict the desired outcome “that 
are really just preexisting patterns of exclusion and inequality,” which cannot be 
resolved computationally (Barocas and Selbst 2016).
While ML and non-traditional data are not currently used in the heavily regu-
lated US mortgage lending market, recent literature has focused on whether ML 
could benefit both the lenders and the potential borrowers by providing more precise 
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default predictions. Fuster et  al., for example, find that using more complex algo-
rithms (random forest) results in an increase in loans for both white applicants and 
racial minorities (Fuster et al. 2017).
The introduction of algorithmic decision-making has revived the debate on what 
it means to unfairly discriminate based on race. Human decisionmaking can be 
affected by subconscious biases that are challenging to track, and policies and pro-
cesses can have unexpected impact on minority groups. By contrast, algorithms are 
inherently auditable in their predictions, and the testing of algorithms to see whether 
they achieve the desired outcome provides an opportunity for researchers and pol-
icy-makers to define and formalise what it means to make a fair decision.
3  Methodology
3.1  Data
It is not within the scope of this paper to perform any empirical analyses on the pres-
ence of discrimination in mortgage lending decisions. There is insufficient informa-
tion in the public data set to draw such conclusions. A sample is drawn from the US 
mortgage lending data set to bring the analysis to life.
The data used are collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
from all lenders above a size threshold that are active in metropolitan areas (esti-
mated to cover 90% of first-lien mortgage originations in the United States). Note 
that the data set does not include the final outcome of the loan, i.e. whether or not 
the individual defaulted on the loan, which is only available within the Federal 
Reserve, and certain pieces of information, e.g. credit scores, are also undisclosed. 
While this would limit the internal validity of any analysis assessing the drivers of 
loan approval, as described above, this should not preclude the demonstration of 
methodologies. The following steps were taken to facilitate the analysis:
• HMDA data from 2011 are used. Since the borrowers in 2011 experienced an 
overall increase in house prices, any default risk is likely specific to the borrower 
rather than reflective of a macroeconomic shock (Fuster et al. 2017);
• The features ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are combined to distinguish between non-His-
panic White applicants and Hispanic White applicants;
• Only black and non-Hispanic White borrowers’ loan data are selected, and other 
race and ethnicities are removed. Past mortgage studies (Ross et al. 2008; Mun-
nell et al. 1996) have shown the greatest disparity in approval rates and treatment 
between these two groups;
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• Loan records with missing data are removed, given they are from exceptional 
situations only. Data points are missing for income1 and location2 in 3.2% of the 
data set; and
• 50,000 accepted loans and 50,000 denied loans are randomly sampled without 
replacement to avoid issues arising from the data imbalance and to facilitate the 
interpretation of accuracy metrics. The true approval rate is 75.6% in the full data 
set; however, a representative sample is not needed, as it is not the aim to draw 
any empirical conclusions about the drivers of approval. The full data set has 
92.9% white vs. black, while the sampled data has 90.7% white vs. black.
3.2  Algorithms
The objective of the lender is to predict whether the loan would be accepted or 
denied. Five algorithms with varying mathematical approaches and complexity were 
selected:
• Logistic regression (LR) with no regularisation
• K-nearest neighbours classification (KNN), with K = 5
• Classification and regression tree (CART)
• Gaussian Naïve Bayes (NB)
• Random forest (RF)
The goal of this article is not to provide a complete survey of algorithms to pre-
dict default, but rather, to use several algorithms to provide an indicative result to 
demonstrate the practicality of a methodology. While this is far from a comprehen-
sive list of algorithms, these five were selected to represent the most variations in 
mathematical models to compare. CART was selected as a logic-based algorithm 
with strong interpretability, and RF added an ensemble learning method construct-
ing multiple decision trees through bootstrap aggregation (bagging) to reduce over-
fitting to the training data. Logistic regression was chosen as another interpretable 
algorithm but with linear decision boundaries. K-nearest neighbours classification 
is an unsupervised method relying on distance metric. The Naïve Bayes represents 
a statistical approach with an explicit underlying probability model. These represent 
the largest variation of mathematical approaches out of some of the most commonly 
used classification algorithms (Kotsiantis et al. 2007).
All predictors in the feature set (Appendix) were used, with the exception of race, 
sex, and minority population of the census tract area. In the US, the Equal Credit 
1 Income is not recorded: (1) when an institution does not consider applicant’s income in the credit deci-
sion, (2) the application is for a multifamily dwelling, (3) the applicant is not a natural person (e.g. a 
business), or (4) the loan was purchased by an institution (Source: https ://www.ffiec .gov/hmda/gloss ary.
htm).
2 Property address is not reported: (1) if the property address is unknown, (2) if the property is not 
located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area or Division in which the institution has an office, (3) if loan is 
to a small business, or (4) when the property is located in a county with a population of 30,000 or less 
(Source: https ://files .consu merfi nance .gov/f/20151 1_cfpb_hmda-repor ting-not-appli cable .pdf).
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Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974 prohibits credit discrimination on the basis of 
race, and this would preclude lenders from including these features in the decision-
making process. Legally, lenders are required to make lending decisions “as if they 
had no information about the applicant’s race, regardless of whether race is or is not 
a good proxy for risk factors not easily observed by a lender” (Ladd 1998). There 
are important studies showing that the inclusion of these features may result in both 
fairer and more accurate outcomes (Kleinberg et al. 2018), which will be addressed 
in the Sect. 4.4. With tenfold cross validation, the accuracy and standard deviation 
are shown in Fig. 1.
4  Limitations of Existing Fairness Literature
To address the increasing concern that algorithms may reinforce unfair biases in the 
data, scholars have introduced dozens of different notion of fairness in the past few 
years. This sudden inundation of definitions prompted some researchers to attempt 
to disentangle the nuanced differences between them, such as the tutorial on “21 
Definitions of Fairness and their Politics” (Narayanan 2018) and the article “Fair-
ness Definitions Explained” (Verma and Rubin 2018). However, they only focus on 
the mathematical formalisation of each definition without addressing the broader 
practical and ethical implications. Given the considerable disagreement among peo-
ple’s perception of what “fairness” entails (Grgic-Hlaca et  al. 2018), the absolute 
representation of fairness oversimplifies the measurement of unfair discrimination. 
This section categorises fairness definitions into four broad groups and discusses 
Fig. 1  Algorithm comparison in predicting loan approval
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their approach, ethical grounding, and limitations in the context of mortgage 
lending.
4.1  Ex Post Fairness
Aligned to the legal rulings that focus on disparate impact, an ex post approach 
appraises fairness based on the final outcome only, rather than intent or expectation 
at the time of decision-making.
4.1.1  Group Fairness
Group fairness, or demographic parity, is a population-level metric that requires 
equal proportion of outcome independent of race. This can be in absolute numbers 
(in HMDA data, if 1000 black and 1000 white applicants’ loans are approved) or in 
proportion to the population (e.g. of 9350 black and 90,650 white applicants, 935 
black and 9065 white applicants’ loans are approved). Formally, with Ŷ  as the pre-
dicted outcome and A as a binary protected attribute:
With 29% approval rate for black borrowers and 52% approval rate for white bor-
rowers, the data set is in clear violation of the group fairness metric. It is important 
to highlight that in the US, the definition of disparate impact is a variation of group 
fairness. The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) imposed a 
rule that the selection rate of the protected group (black borrowers) should be at 
least 80% of the selection rate of the other group (white borrowers) (Feldman et al. 
2015). Given the lenders in this sample data set have approved 52% of loans by 
white applicants and 29% of loans by black applicants, the black-to-white approval 
ratio is 55.8%, which is below the 80% threshold and therefore classed as having 
disparate impact. Feldman et al. (2015) have formalised the approach to identifying 
disparate impact, but their methodology for pre-processing the data to remove the 
bias has shown instability in performance of the technique (Feldman et al. 2015).
This rather arbitrary threshold mandates equal outcome irrespective of relative 
credit-worthiness or differences in financial abilities, which is fundamentally at odds 
with the attempt to make the best prediction of default risk. When there are fea-
tures that are causally and strongly associated with outcome (e.g. income) but also 
strongly correlated to protected group membership (e.g. race/gender), this criterion 
would actively attempt to correct an existing bias, even if it results in reverse dis-
crimination and loss in accuracy in predicting risk.
4.1.2  Equalisation of Evaluation Metrics
Equalisation of error metrics represent the notion of equality in opportunity, in 
contrast to equal outcome (group fairness). Each of these attempts to formalise the 











Algorithmic Fairness in Mortgage Lending: from Absolute…
The lender would select a metric based on the error that matters the most. The 
False Positives (FP) represent lost opportunity (predicted default, but would have 
repaid), and the False Negatives (FN) represent lost revenue (predicted repayment, 
but defaulted). Note that in the mortgage lending use case, the True Positive (TP) 
and False Positive (FP) rates are unknown. If the borrower is predicted to default, 
the loan would likely be denied. This problem persists in other domains: the poten-
tial performance of an individual who was not hired and the recidivism risk of a 
criminal who was not granted bail are both unknown.3
First, the following are the error rates used in the metrics, with the examples from 
mortgage lending provided in the Confusion Matrix in Table 1:
• True Positive Rate (TPR) = TP/(TP + FN)
• True Negative Rate (TNR) = TN/(FP + TN)
• False Positive Rate (FPR) = FP/(FP + TN) = 1 − TNR
• False Negative Rate (FNR) = FN/(FN + TP) = 1 − TPR
• Positive Predictive Value (PPV) = TP/(TP + FP)
Some of the most commonly cited fairness definitions in this category include:
• Equal opportunity/false negative error rate balance (Hardt et  al. 2016) Equal 
FNR. Among applicants who are credit-worthy and would have repaid their 
loans, both black and white applicants should have similar rate of their loans 
being approved;
• False positive error rate balance/predictive equality (Chouldechova 2017): 
Equal FPR. Among applicants who would default, both black and white appli-
cants should have similar rate of their loans being denied;
Table 1  Confusion matrix
predicted default predicted repay total 
default      defaulted
repay repaid 









3 Selection bias limits the lender’s ability to calculate these metrics. To counteract this, some scholars 
(Verma and Rubin 2018) have used a credit scoring data and defined FN, for example, as the probability 
of someone with a good credit score being incorrectly being assigned a bad credit score. While this does 
not reflect the decision-making process in lending, as credit scores would have been provided by a third 
party (Fair Isaac Corporation—FICO credit scores), it is a useful circumvention of the missing informa-
tion.
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• Equal odds (Hardt et al. 2016) Equal TPR and FPR, meeting both of the above 
conditions;
• Positive predictive parity (Chouldechova 2017) Equal PPV. Among credit-wor-
thy applicants, the probability of predicting repayment is the same regardless of 
race;
• Positive class balance (Kleinberg et  al. 2016): both credit-worthy white and 
black applicants who repay their loans have an equal average probability score; 
and
• Negative class balance (Kleinberg et al. 2016) both white and black defaulters 
have an equal average probability score.
Below are the results, with a heatmap of the within-column values.
4.1.3  Fairness Impossibility
The higher disparity represents a more flagrant violation of the mathematical condi-
tion. Consider the logistic regression (LR) and random forest (RF) models. Fuster 
et al. found, using the full HMDA 2011 data, that RF returned greater outcome dis-
parity between black and white loan applicants than LR (Fuster et al. 2017). This is 
mostly supported in Fig. 2, as RF has higher disparity in error rates for all metrics 
except PPP. PPP condition is violated if the probability of predicting repayment (and 
thus loan approval) is unequal between white and black applicants who would have 
repaid the loan.
This is as expected, given that equalised odds and PPP are mathematically incom-
patible (see (Chouldechova 2017) for the proof). In addition, it has been proven 
impossible to simultaneously satisfy group fairness, negative class balance, and 
positive class balance (Kleinberg et  al. 2016). While the trade-offs between other 
combinations of definitions have not been formally tested, it is clear that no model 
would meet all the conditions.
Existing attempts at operationalising fairness tests, such as AI 360 Fairness by 
IBM (Bellamy et al. 2018) and Aequitas Project by UChicago (Saleiro et al 2018), 
produce reports with pass/fail results of a combination of the above metrics by using 
an error threshold (e.g. parity of less than 10%). Without consideration of how the 
disparity translates into the use case, the thresholds set are rather arbitrary.
Fig. 2  Heatmap table: results of fairness tests (% difference)
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Given that many of these metrics are mathematically incompatible, it is difficult 
to interpret the trade-offs between the fairness conditions. Is a 30 percentage point 
decrease in positive predictive parity (LR to RF) preferable to a 15 percentage point 
decrease in negative class balance (RF to LR)? It is difficult to derive meaning from 
these absolute conditions of fairness.
4.1.4  Proxies of Race and Proxies of Risk
Scholars have recently attempted to map some of these metrics to the moral and 
ethical philosophical frameworks (Heidari et al. 2018; Lee 2019) to aid in the met-
ric selection process. However, Heidari et al. make a critical assumption that there 
exists a clear delineation between features that are “irrelevant,” e.g. race, and those 
that can be controlled by the individual. The mortgage market does not exist in a 
vacuum; while potential borrowers can improve their credit-worthiness to a certain 
extent, e.g. by building employable skills and establishing a responsible payment 
history, it is difficult to isolate the features from discrimination in related markets, 
historical inequalities, and the impact of their personal history. It is challenging to 
imbue each definition with ethical values when the definitions do not meet the core 
assumptions of the moral reasoning (Lee 2019).
4.1.5  Existing Structural Bias
One key limitation of these fairness metrics is that they fail to address discrimination 
already in the data (Gajane 2017). In another piece of work on “fairness impossibil-
ity,” Friedler et al. point out that each fairness metric requires different assumptions 
about the gap between the observed space (features) vs. the construct space (unob-
servable variables). They conclude from their analysis that “if there is structural 
bias in the decision pipeline, no [group fairness] mechanism can guarantee fairness” 
(Friedler et al. 2016). This is supported in a critique of existing classification parity 
metrics, in which the authors conclude that “to the extent that error metrics differ 
across groups, that tells us more about the shapes of the risk distributions than about 
the quality of decisions” (Corbett-Davies and Goel 2018). In mortgage lending, with 
documented structural discrimination, these group-level metrics fail to address the 
bias already embedded in the data. This problem is shared by the ex ante fairness 
definitions (Gajane 2017).
4.2  Ex Ante Fairness
Some scholars have introduced metrics to disaggregate fairness, which test for each 
individual prediction. This is practical for live and continuous decisionmaking, as it 
returns whether a single decision is fair at that point in time.
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4.2.1  Individual Fairness
Various measures of individual fairness have been introduced, in which similar indi-
viduals should receive similar outcomes (Dwork et al. 2012). Formally, for similar 
individuals i and j:
The challenge of this approach is: how to define “similarity” that is independent 
of race (Kim et al. 2018). Given minority borrowers were more often encouraged 
to consider FHA loans, which are considered to be substantially more expensive to 
finance (Ross et al. 2008), while the type of loan is an important consideration in 
the probability of default, it is also a partial proxy for race. When the predictive 
features are also influenced by protected features, designation of a measurement of 
“similarity” cannot be independent of those protected features. Some scholars have 
attempted to incorporate active corrections for racial inequality into metrics of simi-
larity (Dwork et al. 2012), but this depends heavily on the assumption that the ine-
quality due to racial discrimination can be isolated from other sources of inequality.
4.2.2  Counterfactual Fairness
Counterfactual fairness condition is whether the loan decision is the same in the actual 
world as it would be in a counterfactual world in which the individual belonged to a 
different racial group (Kusner et al. 2017). This metric posits that given a causal model 
(U, V, F) with a set of observable variables V, a set of latent background variables U 
not caused by V, and a set of functions F, the counterfactual of belonging to a protected 
class is independent of the outcome. Where X represents the remaining attributes, A 
represents the binary protected attribute, Y is the actual outcome, and Ŷ is the predicted 
outcome, formally:
While this provides an elegant abstraction of the algorithm, the causal mechanisms 
of a default on a mortgage is not well understood. It is also difficult to isolate the impact 
of one’s race on the risk of default from the remaining loan and borrower features. In 
this particular use case, pre-defining a causal model is especially challenging.
4.3  Limitations in Existing Approaches to Fairness
Existing approaches to fairness impose an absolute mathematical condition, whether 
comparing outcomes between groups, similar individuals, or group error rates. They do 
not account for bias embedded in the data. While these metrics are useful in quantify-
ing the disparity, they are agnostic to the context. They have limited interpretability of 
outcomes specific to each use case and are challenging to set up when the proxy for 
outcome is intertwined with the proxy for race. Moreover, they only focus on the risk 
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Rather than evaluating fairness against an absolute target (e.g. outcome disparity of 
0), a decision-maker may consider fairness as a relative notion, shifting the focus from 
the quantification of unfairness against a formula to how the algorithm performs in 
comparison to other possible algorithms. If the goal is to select the best possible algo-
rithm, the fairness metrics may not fully embody what is “best.” In reality, a decision-
maker has several competing objectives.
While it may be impossible to remove all bias, it is possible to build an algorithm 
that is fairer and more accurate than the alternative. A new approach is required that 
builds on the previous fairness definitions but leverages the context-dependency of the 
data available and the relational nature of whether a decision is fair. This would provide 
more holistic and tangible information to the lender.
5  Proposal of Trade‑off Analysis
This section will propose an alternative approach that can address the contextual 
complexity and provides a more precise proxy for what represents the “best” algo-
rithm for the decision-maker. This provides information that cannot be derived from 
the fairness analysis by assessing an algorithm’s effectiveness in achieving concrete 
objectives specific to the domain area. This section will demonstrate this methodol-
ogy using the US mortgage lending data set.
5.1  Operationalisation of Variables
Two of a lender’s objectives that also intersect with public interest are discussed: 
increasing financial inclusion and lowering denial rate of black borrowers. An 
increase in access to credit represents the lender’s growth in market share, as well 
as being a global development goal due to its importance for the economy and for 
individuals’ upward mobility (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 2012; King and Levine 
1993). This is affected by the accuracy of the algorithm in predicting default (i.e. 
potential revenue loss). The impact on racial minorities is important to consider to 
comply with regulatory requirements, to manage reputational and ethical risks, and 
to mitigate the racial bias embedded in the data.
5.1.1  Financial Inclusion
In order to estimate the impact of an algorithm on financial inclusion, the following 
assumptions are made:
Assumption 1 HMDA data represent the perfect model. In other words, the loans 
accepted by the HMDA lenders were repaid in full, and the loans denied would have 
defaulted. Note that in reality, we would not know whether those who are denied a 
loan would have defaulted; however, this information is not used in this analysis (see 
definition of negative impact on minorities in Sect. 4.1.2).
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Assumption 2 There is one hypothetical lender. The HMDA data represent a mul-
titude of US-based lenders, but this analysis will focus on a lender-level analysis. 
Future work can assess the impact on a market-level in a multi-player model.
Assumption 3 The lender has a capital limit of $1 billion and gives out loans 
through the following process:
1. The lender uses an algorithm to predict whether or not the loan will default;
2. The lender sorts the loans by the highest probability of repayment; and
3. The lender accepts the loans with most certain repayments until the capital limit 
has been reached.
Assumption 4 The loans are either fully paid or will default, i.e. the lender gets the 
full amount back, or none. This simplifies the expected return calculation by ignor-
ing the differential interest rates and partial payments.
Assumption 5 The lender aims to maximise the expected value of the loan, which 
is the accuracy of the algorithm × the loan amount. In other words, if the accuracy 
of the algorithm is 60% in predicting default, and the loan is for $1 million, then 
the expected value is $600,000 given there is a 60% chance of full repayment vs. 
default.
Assumption 6 There is no differentiation in terms, conditions, and interest rates 
between racial groups. Different rates can be used to pricediscriminate, resulting in 
unequal distribution of the benefits of financial inclusion. While this is an important 
consideration for future studies, this analysis will only consider the aggregate-level 
financial inclusion.
With the above assumptions, financial inclusion can be roughly estimated with 
the expected value of the loans, which, when maximised, represents the lender’s 
ability to give out more loans. A total expected value of $600 million represents 
4000 loans of $150,000 (the median loan value in the data set).
This is a rough definition from a single lender’s perspective. While the multi-
faceted macroeconomic definition and measurement of financial inclusion have 
been contentious, the primary objective for building an inclusive financial system 
is to minimise the percentage of individuals involuntarily excluded from the mar-
ket due to imperfect markets, including incomplete/imperfect information (Amidži 
et al. 2014). The reduction of portfolio risk with more complete information on each 
loan’s credit-worthiness can be viewed as reducing this asymmetry and improving 
efficiency. Future work may revisit this definition to expand beyond the lender-level 
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5.1.2  Negative Impact on Minorities
Moving away from what is fair, what is the comparative adverse impact on black 
mortgage applicants for each algorithm? This will be measured simply as the per-
centage of black applicants who were denied a loan under the algorithm, which is 
the number of denied loans by black applicants/total number of black applicants. 
Note this does not consider whether those who were denied a loan would have 
defaulted. Alternative objectives may be constructed from the fairness metrics, e.g. 
black-white outcome disparity (group fairness). To demonstrate this as a supplement 
to the fairness metrics, we will use this raw measure of impact on potential black 
borrowers.
5.2  Trade‑off Analysis
With the variables operationalised as per above, Fig.  3 shows a chart of financial 
inclusion vs. negative impact on minorities. The baseline represents the outcome 
at 50% accuracy (random chance) in predicting default. The error bars around each 
expected value corresponds to the standard deviation in the accuracy of the algo-
rithm in a tenfold cross-validation.
Note that the ordering of the expected value of the loans coincides with the 
algorithms’ accuracies. Some algorithms are better at predicting the loan out-
come than others, yet the existing fairness metrics overlook the opportunities and 
customer benefit provided by a more accurate predictor, which needs to be con-
sidered in any evaluation of an algorithm. If the true relationship between default 
and the input features were linear, a linear model would return the best accuracy. 
However, given that defaulting on a loan is a complex phenomenon to model with 
an unknown combination of potential causal factors, it is reasonable to expect that 
its prediction will be better modelled by more complex (non-linear) algorithms.
Fig. 3  Trade-off: financial inclusion vs. negative impact on minorities
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Also note that overall (e.g. KNN, LR, RF), negative impact on black applicants 
increases with higher algorithm accuracy. In other words, the increase in the 
aggregate benefit (financial inclusion) tends to be at the expense of the welfare of 
the minority and disadvantaged group. There is one notable exception: NB has a 
much higher denial rates of black applicants than RF, even though its accuracy is 
lower. This could suggest that NB may be overfitting to the proxies of race. This 
aligns with the finding of Fuster et al. using the HMDA 2011 data: in a lending 
system using random forest, the “losers” who would have received a loan under a 
logistic regression algorithm who no longer qualify are predominantly from racial 
minority groups, especially black (Fuster et al. 2017).
Random forest is better in absolute terms (in both financial inclusion and impact 
on minorities) than Naïve Bayes. Random Forest has 10.7 lower percentage points in 
denial rates for black applicants. Given the median loan value is $150,000, moving 
from NB to RF results in 368 new medianvalue loans totalling $55.27 million. The 
decision is more ambiguous between CART and LR. While CART is more accurate 
and results in greater financial inclusion (equivalent of $15.6 million of loans, or 
103 median-value loans), CART results in a 3.8 percentage points increase in denial 
rates for black loan applicants compared to LR.
This analysis reveals and quantifies the concrete stakes for the decisionmaker, 
which provides additional information to the absolute fairness tests. It would enable 
the lender to select the algorithm that best reflects its values and its risk appetite. Of 
course, not all competing objectives can be quantified; regulatory/legal requirements 
and explainability of algorithms should all also be considered. For example, RF may 
be deemed unacceptable due to the relative challenge in interpretability compared 
to LR. This gap may be narrowing, however, as important progress has been made 
in recent years in developing model-agnostic techniques to explain machine learn-
ing algorithms’ predictions in human-readable formats (Ribeiro et al. 2016; Wachter 
et al. 2017). While these methods are not without their challenges in bridging the 
gap between real-life and machinelearning objectives (Lipton 2018), they could be 
used to help interrogate the drivers of each individual prediction regardless of model 
complexity.
One of the benefits of this methodology is its flexibility. The axes can be adapted 
to the domain area and the decision-maker’s interests. In other use cases, e.g. hir-
ing or insurance pricing, the trade-off curve would look very different. Other algo-
rithms—whether rules-based process or a stochastic model—can also be mapped on 
this trade-off chart.
5.3  Proxies of Race
Why would some algorithms affect black applicants more than others? Fuster et al. 
have shown that some machine learning algorithms are able to triangulate race from 
other variables and features in the model, reinforcing this racial bias (Fuster et al. 
2017). This phenomenon is termed “proxy discrimination” (Datta et al. 2017).
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When a logistic regression algorithm is run to predict race instead of loan out-
come with the same set of features, all features are statistically significant in their 
associations with race except for: FSA/RHS-guaranteed loan type, owner occupancy 
status, and property type. The following features are associated with the applicant’s 
race being black: having a lower income and a lower loan amount and being from 
a census tract area with low median family income, smaller number of 1–4 family 
units and owner-occupied units, larger population size, and a lower tract-to-MSA/
MD income. Of the categorical features, one feature with especially high regression 
coefficient is the FHA-insured loan type.
With all other categorical features set as the baseline and given the data set’s 
median values for each of the continuous features, the probability of the applicant’s 
race being black if his loan type is FHA-insured is 36.16%. Otherwise, the probabil-
ity that he/she is black is 19.38%—a 16.78 percentage point difference. This sup-
ports the finding from the paired audit study (Ross et al. 2008) that black applicants 
tend to be referred to the more expensive FHA-insured loans.
Loan type is also statistically significant in a logistic regression to predict 
loan outcome, with FHA-insured loan type being negatively associated with loan 
approval probability. Therefore, having an FHA-insured loan type is both a proxy for 
risk (given the higher cost) and a proxy for race. Given the statistical significance of 
these features, it is clear that the applicant’s race can be inferred to a certain extent 
from their combination.
This discredits the existing “fairness through unawareness” approach of lend-
ers (Ladd 1998), which attempts to argue that non-inclusion of protected features 
implies fair treatment. Some have suggested removing the proxies as well as the pro-
tected characteristics (Datta et al. 2017). The attempt to “repair” the proxies through 
pre-processing the data to remove the racial bias has been shown to be impracti-
cal and ineffective when the predictors are correlated to the protected characteris-
tic; even strong covariates are often legitimate factors for decisions (Corbett-Davies 
and Goel 2018). There is no simple mathematical solution to unfairness; the proxy 
dependencies must be addressed on the systemic level (Ramadan et al. 2018). In the 
case of mortgages, lenders must review their policy on why an FHA-insured loan 
type may be suggested over others and how this may affect the racial distribution of 
loan types.
In addition, recall that one of the key limitations of both ex post and ex ante fair-
ness metrics is their inability to account for discrimination embedded in the data 
(Gajane 2017). Given that the proxy for risk cannot be separated from the proxies 
for race, individual fairness metrics would be challenging to set up. With the proof 
of past discrimination embedded in the data through the marketing, paired audit, and 
regression studies, mortgage lending fairness also cannot be evaluated through sim-
ple disparity in error rates. Having a perfect counterfactual would be desirable, as it 
would disentangle the complex dependencies between covariates if we had the true 
underlying causal directed acylic graph. However, this is challenging to achieve in 
predicting default. For this use case, the trade-off-driven approach is more appropri-
ate than the fairness metrics.
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5.4  Triangulation of Applicant’s Race
If race can, in fact, be triangulated through the remaining loan and borrower char-
acteristics, this implies: (1) the inclusion of race in the algorithm would likely not 
make a difference in the algorithm’s accuracy, and (2) the extent to which the accu-
racy changes with the inclusion of race depends on the algorithm’s ability to trian-
gulate this information. To test this, we included the race in the features to predict 
loan outcome and re-ran each of the algorithms. With δij as accuracy of algorithm j 
on sample i with race, the changes due to inclusion of race are plotted in Fig. 4.
Two-sample paired t-tests were run on the accuracies before and after the inclu-
sion of race, given they are from the sample cross-validation samples with an added 
predictor. The results are below with * next to those that are statistically significant 
at a 5% level:
• LR: t-statistic = 1.71, p-value = 0.12
• KNN: t-statistic = 0.56, p-value = 0.59
• CART: t-statistic = 2.41, p-value = 0.040*
• NB: t-statistic = − 6.22, p-value = 0.00015*
• RF: t-statistic = 4.04, p-value = 0.0029*
There is minimal difference in most algorithms’ accuracies. NB and KNN’s accu-
racies are, in fact, worsened by the inclusion of race, but only NB’s change is sta-
tistically significant. Inclusion of race in CART, LR, and RF positively affect the 
accuracy in predicting the loan outcome, with the results of CART and RF being 
statistically significant. NB results may be unstable given that its assumption that the 
predictor variables are independent is violated, and including race in the feature set 
results in the algorithms over-fitting to race. RF is better at handling feature depend-
encies and avoiding over-fitting through its bootstrapping methods (Kotsiantis et al. 
2007), and its robustness to redundant information may explain this result.
Fig. 4  Change in algorithm accuracy after inclusion of race
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If, in fact, racial information is embedded in the other features, can algorithms 
predict race? Each algorithm was run to predict race based on the given features, 
rather than loan outcome. Given the imbalance in the race, instead of accuracy met-
rics, the performance of the algorithms would be best evaluated by the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) and its Area Under the Curve, which measure the 
True Positive Rate and the False
Positive rate of the algorithms The ROC curves are plotted in Fig. 5. The ideal 
ROC curve hugs the upper left corner of the chart, with AUC close to 1. The red 
dotted line can be interpreted as random chance. In this particular data sample, it 
appears that RF, KNN and NB have relatively higher AUC than LR and CART, 
showing that they are better performers in predicting race with the given set of fea-
tures. Further study is required to understand what types of mathematical models are 
better able to predict protected characteristics and the corresponding impact on the 
results.
Given these outcomes, it is reasonable that the trade-off curve does not shift much 
with the inclusion of race. Figure 6 shows the impact of adding race on the trade-off 
curve. While it does tend to increase the denial rates of black applicants, the differ-
ence is small compared to the impact of algorithm selection.
The applicant’s race can be triangulated from the remaining features, highlighting 
the importance of algorithm selection, which has a greater impact on the trade-off 
between objectives than the inclusion of race as a predictor. The indicative results 
show that some algorithms are better at triangulating race than others, which should 
be explored in future studies to help inform the role of model type on the trade-offs.
Fig. 5  ROC curves of each algorithm to predict race
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In summary, the trade-off can be set up by: (1) defining and quantifying the real-
world objectives into measurements, (2) building algorithms and computing relevant 
metrics, (3) identifying potential proxies of protected characteristics to interrogate 
whether their inclusion in the model is justifiable, and (4) selecting the algorithm 
that best reflect the prioritisation of competing objectives.
Overall, the trade-off analysis reveals concrete and measurable impact of select-
ing an algorithm in relation to the alternatives. Given the ability of algorithms to 
triangulate race from other features, the current standard approach of excluding race 
is shown to be ineffective. The disentanglement of proxies for race and proxies for 
loan outcome, as demonstrated through the analysis of FHA-insured loan types, 
challenges the assumptions of the existing absolute fairness metrics. When there are 
multiple competing objectives, this approach can provide actionable information to 
the lender on which algorithm best meets them.
5.5  Limitations and Future Work
This article aimed to demonstrate the trade-off methodology within the scope of 
one case study: racial bias in US mortgage lending. The analysis was limited by 
the data set, which did not provide the full set of information required to mimic 
the decision-making process of a lender. With additional information on default out-
come, terms and conditions of the loans, credit history, profitability of the loan, etc., 
a more empirically meaningful assessment would be possible of the algorithms and 
their effectiveness in meeting the lender’s goals. Despite the incomplete data, the 
methodology demonstrated that it is possible to expose an interpretable and domain-
specific outcome in selecting a decision-making model. The assumptions made in 
the operationalisation of variables to compensate for the missing information are 
mutable and removable.
Fig. 6  Trade-off with and without race
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This paper only begins to unravel the possibilities of the relativistic tradeoff tech-
nique, in contrast to the existing approaches to fairness in literature. Some of the 
areas for future exploration include:
The change in trade-off curve based on different joint distributions between race 
and default: It would be interesting to visualise the changes in the trade-offs depending 
on the amount of outcome disparity between black and white borrowers in the data set. 
The degree to which the increase in aggregate benefit is at the expense of the protected 
group is likely related to the joint distribution between the predicted outcome and race.
Addition of other algorithm types: It is important to better understand what math-
ematical set-up leads an algorithm to be more affected by bias in the data. In addition, 
algorithms that are post-processed to calibrate the predictions, while critiqued in their 
appropriateness and efficacy (Corbett-Davies and Goel 2018), can be added to the 
trade-off analysis to examine how they impact the denial rates and financial inclusion.
Generalisation to other domain areas, e.g. pricing, hiring, and criminal recidivism: 
Depending on the different competing objectives in other domain areas, the variables 
may change in the trade-off analysis. For example, two of the objectives in a hiring 
algorithm may be increase in diversity (i.e. percentage of minority groups hired) and 
an increase in performance metrics of the team. While the technique may be generalis-
able to other case studies, it would be useful to identify the nuances in the differences 
in underlying data sets, ethical considerations, and legal and regulatory precedents.
Generalisation to other local markets While this analysis is limited to the US 
context, further work should contextualise the methodology to local regional con-
texts, including any documented history of discriminatory practices against legally 
protected groups and competing priorities in market.
Multi-player model Only one lender’s perspective was considered; regulators 
and policy-makers would be interested in the market-level analysis in which all the 
lenders’ decisions are aggregated. While it was assumed that the lender has the sole 
authority to decide on which algorithm is the most appropriate, this may be limited 
by the perspectives of customers and of the market regulators. To understand the 
policy implications, multiple stakeholders’ objectives must be considered.
6  Conclusion
The one-size-fits-all, binary, and axiomatic approaches to fairness are insufficient in 
addressing the complexities of racial discrimination in mortgage lending. We aimed 
to introduce and demonstrate a new methodology that addresses the limitations of 
existing approaches to defining fairness in algorithmic decision-making. The new 
analysis views fairness in relation to alternatives, attempting to build a model that 
best reflects the values of a decision-maker in the face of inevitable trade-offs.
There has been a massive proliferation of fairness definitions with only minor 
variations, without a corresponding unpacking of the nuances in the assumptions 
and ethical values embedded in the choice of each definition. Given the “fairness 
impossibility” of many of the formalisations, despite the importance of identifying 
the most suitable definition for a use case, the focus on defining fairness in a gener-
alisable mathematical formula renders the results of the tests difficult to interpret. 
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To clarify what is at stake, an approach more attentive to the complexities of the use 
case could complement the fairness tests by providing more concrete information to 
the decisionmaker.
We introduced a new methodology that views fairness—not as an absolute 
mathematical condition—but as a trade-off between competing objectives in rela-
tion to alternatives. The goal of the decision-maker is to build an algorithm that 
is better on multiple dimensions in relation to any existing process or model. By 
mapping the trade-off between financial inclusion and impact on black borrowers, 
a lender has access to tangible and explainable justification for selecting one algo-
rithm over another. This can inform regulators and policy-makers on the lender’s 
decision-making process and the plausible alternatives that were explored, ena-
bling them to make concrete recommendations on what is an acceptable level of 
risk in meeting each objective. While this analysis was limited to five algorithms, 
any model, from rules-based credit score cards to neural networks to ensemble 
models, can be added to the trade-off curve. The process can also be adapted to 
decisions in other domains, such as hiring, pricing, and criminal recidivism.
The controversy of discriminatory mortgage lending predates the introduction 
of algorithms for credit risk evaluation, but the latter has more recently sparked a 
debate on how to formalise fairness as a mathematical condition for algorithms to 
satisfy in its predictions. A key risk of algorithms is that it may reinforce existing 
biases in the data, system, and society and exacerbate racial inequality. However, 
algorithms are not necessarily more discriminatory than existing processes. If 
implemented with caution, its auditability presents an opportunity for the market, 
lenders, and customers to consider all available options within real-world con-
straints and define what they want from a fair system.
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Appendix
Features
Table of features in HMDA data, found in: https ://www.ffiec .gov/hmdar awdat a/
FORMA TS/2011H MDACo deShe et.pdf (see Table 2).
Table 2  Features
Feature Type Values
Income Numeric ,000 s
Sex Categorical female, male, unknown, not applicable
Race Categorical White, black/African American, African Indian/
Alaskan Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian/
Pacific Islander, unknown
Ethnicity Categorical Hispanic, non-Hispanic
Agency Categorical Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Dept 
of Housing and Urban Development, Federal 
deposit insurance corporation, Federal 
Reserve System, National Credit Union 
Administration, Office of the Comptroller of 
the currency
Owner occupancy Categorical Owner-occupied, not owner-occupied, not 
applicable
Property type Categorical Manufactured housing, one-to-four family 
dwelling
Loan purpose Categorical Home improvement, Home purchase, Refinanc-
ing, Conventional
Loan type Categorical Conventional, FHA insured, FSA RHS guaran-
teed, VA guaranteed
Loan amount Numeric ,000 s
Population Numeric Total population in the census tract
Minority population Numeric %: percentage of minority population to total 
population for tract
FFIEC median family come 
ethnicity
In-numeric USD Median family income in dollars for 
the MSA/MD in which the tract is located 
(adjusted annually by FFIEC)
Tract to MSA/MD median numeric family income 
percentage
% of tract median family income compared to 
MSA/MD median family income
Number of owner occupied numeric units Number of dwellings, including individual con-
dominiums, that are lived in by the owner
Number of 1- to 4-family numeric units Dwellings that are built to house fewer than 5 
families
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